MVA v. Richards

Motor Vehicle Administration v. David Walter Richards, Jr., No. 2, September Term, 1999.
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW—EVIDENCE—EXCLUSIONARY RULE—The exclusionary
rule of the Fourth Amendment is not applicable in civil administrative driver’s license
suspension proceedings conducted pursuant to § 16-205.1(f) of the Transportation Article
of the Maryland Code.
Circuit Court for Carroll County
Case No. C-98-26541
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF
MARYLAND
No. 2
September Term, 1999
MOTOR VEHICLE ADMINISTRATION
v.
DAVID WALTER RICHARDS, JR.
Bell, C.J.
Eldridge
Rodowsky
Raker
Wilner
Cathell
Karwacki, Robert L.
(Retired, Specially Assigned),
JJ.
Opinion by Raker, J.
Rodowsky, J., concurs in the result only.
Filed: October 14, 1999
1 The facts pertinent to this appeal have been gleaned from the undisputed testimonial
evidence presented at Respondent’s license suspension hearing.
Following a hearing before the Motor Vehicle Administration on January 15, 1998,
an Administrative Law Judge suspended the driver’s license of Respondent, David Walter
Richards, Jr., for a period of 120 days. Respondent’s license suspension was based upon his
refusal to take a chemical breath test as requested by an officer of the Maryland State Police
after the officer had stopped Respondent while driving his pickup truck in Carroll County
during the early morning hours of October 24, 1997. Respondent seeks to challenge the
validity of his driver’s license suspension through constitutional scrutiny of the officer’s
initial stop. Our task is to determine whether such a challenge is legally viable. More
specifically, we must decide in this appeal whether the exclusionary rule of the Fourth
Amendment applies in a civil administrative driver’s license suspension proceeding
conducted pursuant to § 16-205.1(f) of the Transportation Article of the Maryland Code. We
shall hold that the rule does not apply and shall therefore reverse the judgment rendered by
the Circuit Court for Carroll County in the present case.
I.
Shortly after midnight on October 24, 1997, Trooper F. W. Quisay, Jr. of the
Maryland State Police was driving through Carroll County on the northern edge of the town
of Westminster.1 As he was patrolling the area and traveling north, the trooper “looked up
on Naugahyde Drive and . . . observed a vehicle’s tail lights either stopped or close to
stopping in the middle of the road right there towards the end of the road.” Aware that
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“Carroll County ha[d] been experiencing a rash of vehicle thefts and night time burglaries
. . . in the area of Westminster and north of Westminster,” and noting that there were no
houses in the vicinity where the vehicle had slowed or stopped, Trooper Quisay “decided to
turn around and check the vehicle to see where [the driver] might be going and see if he was
going into one of the houses [on the street].” Trooper Quisay followed the vehicle, a dark
green pickup truck with a “dealer tag,” onto Naugahyde Drive. Knowing this road to be a
dead end street, the officer surmised that the driver “either lived there or he had no real
business there.” The pickup truck “went all the way to the dead end of Naugahyde Drive,
turned around and came back out . . . without stopping at any of the houses.” Thereupon
Trooper Quisay stopped the vehicle: because it was “12:30 in the morning I just felt that was
a little odd so I decided to stop the car and check on the driver and see what business he may
have had in the neighborhood.”
When Trooper Quisay spoke to the driver, later identified as Respondent, he
immediately “detected a strong odor of an alcoholic beverage.” Trooper Quisay asked
Respondent to step out of the pickup truck and proceeded to administer field sobriety tests.
Based on Respondent’s performance on the tests, Trooper Quisay arrested him and took him
to the police barracks. At the barracks, Respondent refused Trooper Quisay’s request to take
a chemical breath test for blood-alcohol content. Upon Respondent’s refusal, the trooper
issued an order suspending Richards’s driver’s license pursuant to this State’s “administrative
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2 Unless otherwise indicated, all subsequent statutory references shall be to Maryland
Code (1977, 1999 Repl. Vol., 1999 Supp.) Transportation Article.
per se” statute, codified under Maryland Code (1977, 1999 Repl. Vol., 1999 Supp.) §16-
205.1 of the Transportation Article.2
Pursuant to §16-205.1(f), Respondent requested a hearing to determine whether his
driver’s license was properly suspended. The Administrative Law Judge (hereinafter “the
ALJ”) concluded that Respondent’s license was suspended properly as a result of his refusal
to take the chemical breath test requested by Trooper Quisay: the trooper had reasonable
grounds to believe that the Respondent was driving while intoxicated based upon the odor
of alcohol and Respondent’s poor performance of the field sobriety tests. As to the propriety
of the initial stop, the ALJ stated that he had no jurisdiction over the legality of the stop other
than to determine whether the stop was made in good faith, which he found to be true in
Respondent’s case. In that regard, the ALJ stated:
The stop itself was a good faith stop. It doesn’t matter whether
the stop was made because of suspicion of drinking or not.
What matters is that the stop be made just as a good faith stop,
in other words, that people aren’t stopped just because they’re
a different color or whatever or that there’s some kind of
personal animosity or whatever. In this case it’s clear that the
officer had grounds to believe that there was suspicious activity
based on what was going on so he had a grounds to stop the car.
Once he did stop the car, then the question becomes did he have
a reasonable basis to believe that Mr. Richards had been driving
while intoxicated. He notes a moderate odor of alcohol on his
breath. He gave him field sobriety tests, which he failed, all of
which mean that the officer’s process was correct . . . .
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The ALJ ordered Respondent’s license suspended for 120 days for refusing to take a breath
test when properly requested to do so.
On judicial review of the administrative proceeding, the circuit court reversed the
judgment of the ALJ and held that the suspension of Respondent’s license was improper
because Trooper Quisay did not have any justification to stop Respondent’s vehicle. In
announcing its decision, the court stated:
Well, I guess good faith is equating to articulable
suspicion or maybe something less than articulable suspicion,
but there is a constitutional right to not be capriciously or
arbitrarily pulled over by any police officer and questioned
about anything, and there’s a freedom of movement, . . . a
citizen has a right to be on the public streets . . . .
* * * * * *
. . . [E]ven though perhaps the Administrative Law Judge
does not feel he can consider the legality of the stop, I think
somewhere the constitution has to come into play and to follow
his reasoning, as I say, any officer could stop any other officer,
and we have very restrictive procedural matters, particularly
when it comes to things like roadblocks and stopping all the
people that come down the road.
So I think, on those grounds, there was absolutely no
right of Trooper Quisay, at that point. He followed this vehicle
far enough that he could have developed any—any articulable
suspicion that there was someone driving under the influence of
alcohol . . . . So, although we don’t get into the legality of the
stop too often, I think this is pretty blatant. I don’t think there
was any justification for the stop of the person in the first place
and, of course, anything after that, I think, would not be
chargeable to the Defendant. So, I’m gonna reverse the . . .
Administrative Law Judge.
The Motor Vehicle Administration (hereinafter “the MVA” or “the State”) petitioned
this Court for a writ of certiorari to review the circuit court’s ruling. We granted certiorari
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3 Respondent does not cite any authority for the proposition that the refusal to submit
to a test is inadmissible in a related criminal proceeding, independent of the exclusionary rule
of the Fourth Amendment which he seeks to have applied in the present case. Quite the
contrary, Maryland statutory law states, “The fact of refusal to submit is admissible in
evidence at the trial.” Maryland Code (1974, 1998 Repl. Vol., 1999 Supp.) § 10-309(a)(2)
of the Courts & Judicial Proceedings Article (emphasis added). It is true, however, that “[n]o
inference or presumption concerning either guilt or innocence arises because of refusal to
submit.” Id.
to consider whether the exclusionary rule of the Fourth Amendment (1) applies in the civil
administrative driver’s license suspension proceeding provided for under §16-205.1(f) and
(2) thus bars introduction of evidence based on a purportedly unlawful motor vehicle stop,
when an administrative law judge has found that the officer conducting the stop had a good
faith basis for taking that action.
As the petitioner in this case, the MVA argues that the license suspension proceeding
under § 16-205.1(f) does not fall within any exception to the general rule that the
exclusionary rule of the Fourth Amendment does not apply to civil proceedings. The MVA
further contends that the marginal benefits of applying the exclusionary rule to this
proceeding are far outweighed by the substantial social costs its application would impose.
Respondent counters that regardless of legislative enactments or administrative rulemaking,
the exclusionary rule applies to “refusal hearings” under § 16-205.1 because of the
nature and purpose of those hearings:
Since the refusal to take the test is the crux of the refusal
hearing, is inadmissible in the criminal proceeding[3] and clearly
does not provide any evidence of intoxication vel non, the
administrative sanction is clearly punitive. As a purely punitive
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measure, the refusal hearing is more in the nature of a quasicriminal
proceeding such as in One 1995 Corvette . . . .
Respondent’s Brief at 7. The case to which Respondent refers, One 1995 Corvette v.
Baltimore, 353 Md. 114, 724 A.2d 680 (1999), is a recent decision by this Court in which
we held the exclusionary rule of the Fourth Amendment applicable in civil in rem forfeiture
proceedings. See also One 1958 Plymouth Sedan v. Pennsylvania, 380 U.S. 693, 85 S. Ct.
1246, 14 L. Ed. 2d 170 (1965).
II.
Central to this case are the purpose, legal effect and constitutional ramifications of
Maryland’s “implied consent, administrative per se” motor vehicle law, codified as §16-
205.1 of the Transportation Article. In 1988, the General Assembly established a Task Force
on Drunk and Drugged Driving “because ‘the problem of drunk and drugged driving is of
continuing concern to the citizens of the State of Maryland.’” Motor Vehicle Admin. v.
Gaddy, 335 Md. 342, 347, 643 A.2d 442, 444 (1994) (quoting Joint Resolution No. 15 of the
Acts of 1988). As we reiterated last year,
Among the several matters studied by that task force were (1) an
administrative per se law, making both the refusal to take an
alcohol test and the taking of such a test that revealed 0.10 or
greater alcohol concentration an administrative offense that
would lead to the rapid and mandated suspension of the
offender’s driver’s license, and (2) a criminal per se law, that
would make driving with an alcohol concentration of 0.10 or
more a per se criminal offense. See TASK FORCE ON DRUNK
AND DRUGGED DRIVING MINUTES, September 13, 1988,
September 27, 1988, October 13, 1988.
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4 See Laws of Maryland, 1989, Ch. 284, at 2331 (enacting House Bill 556 with
changes); see also Laws of Maryland, 1990, Ch. 11 at 281 (enacting Senate Bill 398 with
changes). Prior to its amendment in 1989, § 16-205.1 already contained an “implied
consent” provision. See Maryland Code (1977, 1987 Repl. Vol., 1988 Supp.) § 16-205.1(a)
of the Transportation Article. Indeed, by this time, all fifty states and the District of
Columbia had enacted implied consent statutes. See Note, Constitutional Law—Implied
Consent Laws: Fourth Amendment Plus Protection for the Drunk Driver, 19 CUMB. L. REV.
177, 177 and n. 3 (1988-89). Moreover, as of July, 1988, twenty-three States and the District
of Columbia had enacted administrative per se statutes. GENERAL ASSEMBLY OF MARYLAND
REPORT OF THE TASK FORCE ON DRUNK AND DRUGGED DRIVING 1988 INTERIM, at 12. See
Janes v. State, 350 Md. 284, 306, 711 A.2d 1319, 1329-30 (1998).
5 Reproduction or synopsis herein of text from § 16-205.1 reflects the statute’s
current form. Any differences between the current form and the form of the statute as
amended in 1989 are either stylistic or, though substantive, unimportant for purposes of our
(continued…)
Janes v. State, 350 Md. 284, 304, 711 A.2d 1319, 1329 (1998).
The Task Force issued a report during the 1988 legislative interim which “addressed
the possibility of establishing an administrative per se law to provide immediate suspension
of a driver’s license of a person detained by police on the suspicion of driving or attempting
to drive while intoxicated or under the influence.” Senate Judicial Proceedings Committee,
Bill Analysis for Senate Bill 398, at 3 (1989). During the 1989 legislative session, the
General Assembly acted upon the Task Force’s recommendation and enacted an implied
consent, administrative per se statute.4 The first two subsections of the statute establish that
(1) by driving on a Maryland public roadway a person impliedly consents to taking a test to
determine breath or blood alcohol concentration if reasonably requested to do so and (2)
although a motorist may refuse to take such a test, such a refusal entails a suspension of the
license to drive.5 Specifically, those subsections provide as follows:
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5(…continued)
present inquiry.
§ 16-205.1. Suspension or disqualification for refusal to
submit to chemical tests for intoxication.
(a) Definitions; implied consent to chemical test. —
* * * * * *
(2) Any person who drives or attempts to drive a motor
vehicle on a highway or on any private property that is used by
the public in general in this State is deemed to have consented,
subject to the provisions of §§ 10-302 through 10-309,
inclusive, of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article, to take
a [breath or blood specimen] test [to determine alcohol
concentration] if the person should be detained on suspicion of
driving or attempting to drive while intoxicated, while under the
influence of alcohol, while so far under the influence of any
drug, any combination of drugs, or a combination of one or
more drugs and alcohol that the person could not drive a vehicle
safely, while under the influence of a controlled dangerous
substance, in violation of an alcohol restriction, or in violation
of § 16-813 of this title.
(b) No compulsion to take chemical test; consequences of
refusal. — (1) Except as provided in subsection (c) of this
section, a person may not be compelled to take a test. However,
the detaining officer shall advise the person that, on receipt of
a sworn statement from the officer that the person was so
charged and refused to take a test, or was tested and the result
indicated an alcohol concentration of 0.10 or more, the
Administration shall:
(i) In the case of a person licensed under this title:
* * * * * *
2. For a test refusal:
A. For a first offense, suspend the driver’s
license for 120 days; or
B. For a second or subsequent offense,
suspend the driver’s license for 1 year . . . .
The portion of the statute immediately succeeding those above provides that “if a
police officer stops or detains any person who the police officer has reasonable grounds to
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believe is or has been” driving or attempting to drive while impaired by alcohol and/or drugs,
“the police officer shall . . . [d]etain the person; . . . [r]equest that the person permit a test to
be taken; and . . . [a]dvise the person of the administrative sanctions that shall be imposed
for refusal to take the test . . . .” § 16-205.1(b)(2). The statute then designates that if a
motorist licensed to drive in Maryland refuses to submit to the requested test, the officer is
obligated, inter alia, to confiscate the Maryland driver’s license, serve an order of
suspension, issue a temporary 45-day license, and advise the motorist of the right to request
an administrative hearing to review the propriety of the license suspension. See §
16-205.1(b)(3). The prerequisites and scope of such a hearing are specified by subsection
(f), as follows :
(f) Notice and hearing on refusal to take test; suspension of
license or privilege to drive; disqualification from driving
commercial vehicles. — (1) Subject to the provisions of this
subsection, at the time of, or within 30 days from the date of,
the issuance of an order of suspension, a person may submit a
written request for a hearing before an officer of the
Administration if:
(i) The person is arrested for driving or attempting to
drive a motor vehicle while intoxicated, while under the
influence of alcohol, while so far under the influence of any
drug, any combination of drugs, or a combination of one or
more drugs and alcohol that the person could not drive a vehicle
safely, while under the influence of a controlled dangerous
substance, in violation of an alcohol restriction, or in violation
of § 16-813 of this title; and
(ii) 1. There is an alcohol concentration of 0.10 or more
at the time of testing; or
2. The person refused to take a test.
* * * * * *
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(7) (i) At a hearing under this section, the person has the
rights described in § 12-206 of this article, but at the hearing the
only issues shall be:
1. Whether the police officer who stops or detains
a person had reasonable grounds to believe the person was
driving or attempting to drive while intoxicated, while under the
influence of alcohol, while so far under the influence of any
drug, any combination of drugs, or a combination of one or
more drugs and alcohol that the person could not drive a vehicle
safely, while under the influence of a controlled dangerous
substance, in violation of an alcohol restriction, or in violation
of § 16-813 of this title;
2. Whether there was evidence of the use by the
person of alcohol, any drug, any combination of drugs, a
combination of one or more drugs and alcohol, or a controlled
dangerous substance;
3. Whether the police officer requested a test after
the person was fully advised of the administrative sanctions that
shall be imposed, including the fact that a person who refuses to
take the test is ineligible for modification of a suspension or
issuance of a restrictive license under subsection (n) (1) and (2)
of this section;
4. Whether the person refused to take the test;
5. Whether the person drove or attempted to drive
a motor vehicle while having an alcohol concentration of 0.10
or more at the time of testing; or
6. If the hearing involves disqualification of a
commercial driver’s license, whether the person was operating
a commercial motor vehicle.
At the conclusion of the hearing, the MVA is required to suspend the Maryland
driver’s license of the motorist for 120 days for a first offense if it has been shown that the
investigating officer complied with the mandates and duties under the statute, there was use
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6 The General Assembly has since granted the MVA the authority to modify a
suspension or issue a restrictive license to a licensee who refused to take a test, provided the
licensee “participates in the Ignition Interlock System Program established under § 16-404.1
of this title for at least 1 year.” § 16-205.1(n)(4); see Laws Of Maryland, 1998, Ch. 526.
Such a resolution, however, was not yet available for Respondent’s case. Indeed, the ALJ
in the present case noted that he was without discretion at the time but to impose a license
suspension of 120 days upon a driver who refused to take the chemical breath test if properly
requested to do so.
7 In 1989, the MVA alerted the Task Force on Drunk and Drugged Drivers as to the
purposeful non-inclusion of constitutional protections for Maryland drivers with respect to
license suspension hearings under § 16-205.1, either in its pre-amended form or under the
proposed (and later adopted) amendment:
The current law in Maryland under TR 16-205.1 requires
that the police officer who stops or detains the individual have
reasonable grounds to believe the individual was driving or
attempting to drive while under the influence of alcohol or drugs
or both. It does not require the police officer to have probable
cause to arrest. Nor does it require that the stop be
constitutional.
* * * * * *
It should also be noted that the issue of probable cause to
arrest cannot be raised now in administrative hearing nor will it
(continued…)
by the motorist of alcohol and/or drugs, and the motorist refused to submit to the properly
requested test. See § 16-205.1(f)(8).6
As we explained in Janes, the General Assembly made a deliberate effort in drafting
§ 16-205.1 to keep the criminal and administrative proceedings resulting from a suspected
drunk-driving incident wholly separate. See id., 350 Md. at 304, 711 A.2d at 1328.
Moreover, subsection (f)(7) makes paramountly clear that the constitutionality of the stop
giving rise to the test request is not one of the issues to be presented at the hearing, nor is the
possible exclusion of unconstitutionally seized evidence.7 Accordingly, Respondent
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7(…continued)
become an issue under the draft bill. This is often a confusing
area for lawyers and judges because in criminal prosecutions the
defense may move to suppress evidence obtained by police
officers if they did not have probable cause to arrest the driver,
which sometimes involves an examination of whether the
officers had a constitutional right to stop the car.
* * * * * *
The draft bill is no different from present law in properly
excluding from consideration at an administrative suspension
hearing whether a police officer had probable cause to arrest the
motorist at the time of the stop or detention. Whether there was
probable cause to arrest may be a factor to be considered in the
criminal trial, but it has no relevance in an Administration
suspension hearing. Even if it were later determined that the
officer did not have probable cause to arrest, this would not
negate an administrative finding that the officer had reasonable
grounds to stop or detain the licensee and request a chemical
test for intoxication.
Revised Memorandum from Ann E. Singleton, Assistant Attorney General, to Peter J. Cobb,
Governor’s Task Force on Drunk and Drugged Drivers, LEGAL IMPLICATIONS OF
ADMINISTRATIVE PER SE PROVISIONS, March 2, 1989.
The COMAR provisions implementing the enacted statute, however, provide that
evidence seized or obtained in violation of a licensee’s Fourth Amendment constitutional
rights is admissible in a subsequent license suspension proceeding “unless the . . . [p]olice
officer, in obtaining or seizing the evidence, acted in bad faith and not as a reasonable officer
should act in similar circumstances . . . .” COMAR 11.11.02.10(H)(1).
concedes that the language of the statute itself gives him no relief in the present matter.
Rather, the core thrust of his appeal is an attack upon the ALJ’s interpretation and
application of the statute as not affording exclusion, under the Fourth Amendment, of his
refusal to take the test from the evidence presented at his license suspension hearing.
Fleshed out more fully, Respondent’s central contention is that whereas the officer’s reasons
for requesting the test that he refused to take resulted from a constitutionally invalid stop,
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those reasons should not be available to demonstrate that the officer had “reasonable
grounds” to believe a test was called for.
III.
The United States Supreme Court just over a year ago revisited the possibility of
extending the operation of the exclusionary rule of the Fourth Amendment beyond the
criminal trial context and, once again, declined to do so. See Pennsylvania Bd. of Probation
v. Scott, 524 U.S. 357, , 118 S. Ct. 2014, 2020, 141 L. Ed. 2d 344 (1998). The majority
summarized the Court’s historical approach to the applicability of the exclusionary rule as
follows:
We have emphasized repeatedly that the State’s use of
evidence obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment does
not itself violate the Constitution. See, e.g., United States v.
Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 906, 104 S.Ct. 3405, 3411-3412, 82
L.Ed.2d 677 (1984); Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 482, 486,
96 S.Ct. 3037, 3046-3047, 3048-3049, 49 L.Ed.2d 1067 (1976).
Rather, a Fourth Amendment violation is “‘fully accomplished’”
by the illegal search or seizure, and no exclusion of evidence
from a judicial or administrative proceeding can “‘cure the
invasion of the defendant’s rights which he has already
suffered.’” United States v. Leon, supra, at 906, 104 S.Ct., at
3412 (quoting Stone v. Powell, supra, at 540, 96 S.Ct., at 3074
(White, J., dissenting)). The exclusionary rule is instead a
judicially created means of deterring illegal searches and
seizures. United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 348, 94
S.Ct. 613, 620, 38 L.Ed.2d 561 (1974). As such, the rule does
not “proscribe the introduction of illegally seized evidence in all
proceedings or against all persons,” Stone v. Powell, supra, at
486, 96 S.Ct., at 3049, but applies only in contexts “where its
remedial objectives are thought most efficaciously served,”
United States v. Calandra, supra, at 348, 94 S.Ct., at 620; see
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8 In a footnote appended to this declaration, the Court distinguished its holding in
One 1958 Plymouth Sedan v. Pennsylvania, 380 U.S. 693, 85 S. Ct. 1246, 14 L. Ed. 2d 170
(1965), citing the criminal law aspects of the forfeiture proceeding involved therein. See
United States v. Janis, 428 U.S. 433, 447 n. 17, 96 S. Ct. 3021, 3029 n. 17, 49 L. Ed. 2d
1046 (1976). Moreover, the Supreme Court has made clear that the exclusionary rule of the
Fourth Amendment does not have all-encompassing effect even in the context of a criminal
trial. See Arizona v. Evans, 514 U.S. 1, 115 S. Ct. 1185, 131 L. Ed. 2d 34 (1995); Illinois
v. Krull, 480 U.S. 340, 107 S. Ct. 1160, 94 L. Ed. 2d 364 (1987); United States v. Leon, 468
U.S. 897, 104 S. Ct. 3405, 82 L. Ed. 2d 677 (1984); United States v. Havens, 446 U.S. 620,
100 S. Ct. 1912, 64 L. Ed. 2d 559 (1980); United States v. Ceccolini, 435 U.S. 268, 98 S. Ct.
(continued…)
also United States v. Janis, 428 U.S. 433, 454, 96 S.Ct. 3021,
3032, 49 L.Ed.2d 1046 (1976) (“If … the exclusionary rule does
not result in appreciable deterrence, then, clearly, its use in the
instant situation is unwarranted”). Moreover, because the rule
is prudential rather than constitutionally mandated, we have held
it to be applicable only where its deterrence benefits outweigh
its “substantial social costs.” United States v. Leon, 468 U.S.,
at 907, 104 S.Ct., at 3412.
Recognizing these costs, we have repeatedly declined to
extend the exclusionary rule to proceedings other than criminal
trials. Id., at 909, 104 S.Ct., at 3413; United States v. Janis,
supra, at 447, 96 S.Ct., at 3028-3029.
Id. at , 118 S. Ct. at 2019. Prior to Scott, the proceedings outside a criminal trial to which
the Supreme Court had refused to extend the exclusionary rule of the Fourth Amendment
included grand jury proceedings, see Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 94 S. Ct. 613; federal civil tax
proceedings, see Janis, 428 U.S. 433, 96 S. Ct. 3021; and civil deportation proceedings, see
I.N.S. v. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. 1032, 104 S. Ct. 3479, 82 L. Ed. 2d 778 (1984). It thus
remains true in the wake of Scott that “[i]n the complex and turbulent history of the
[exclusionary] rule, the Court never has applied it to exclude evidence from a civil
proceeding, federal or state.” Janis, 428 U.S. at 447; 96 S. Ct. at 3029.8 In each case in
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8(…continued)
1054, 55 L. Ed. 2d 268 (1978). Cf. Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 96 S. Ct. 3037, 49 L. Ed.
2d 1067 (1976).
9 Our decision in Chase v. State, 309 Md. 224, 522 A.2d 1348 (1987), was validated
(continued…)
which the Supreme Court has considered so extending this remedy, “the Court determined
that the potential benefit of applying the exclusionary rule was outweighed by the resulting
cost to societal interests.” Riche v. Director of Revenue, 987 S.W.2d 331, 334 (Mo. 1999)
(en banc).
This Court has also been called upon several times to determine the applicability of
the exclusionary rule of the Fourth Amendment to civil proceedings in various contexts. In
only one case have we held the exclusionary rule applicable to a proceeding other than a
criminal trial. See One 1995 Corvette v. Baltimore, 353 Md. 114, 724 A.2d 680 (1999)
(following Supreme Court’s holding in One 1958 Plymouth Sedan v. Pennsylvania, 380 U.S.
693, 85 S. Ct. 1246, 14 L. Ed. 2d 170 (1965) and ruling exclusionary rule of Fourth
Amendment applicable in civil in rem forfeiture proceedings, in part because of their “quasicriminal”
nature). In all other relevant cases we have rejected any extension of the rule to
civil proceedings. See Sheetz v. City of Baltimore, 315 Md. 208, 553 A.2d 1281 (1989)
(holding exclusionary rule generally inapplicable in context of administrative employment
discharge proceedings); Chase v. State, 309 Md. 224, 522 A.2d 1348 (1987) (holding as
general rule that in revocation of probation proceedings, exclusionary rule does not apply to
bar evidence illegally seized by police from probationer);9 Chu v. Anne Arundel County, 311
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9(…continued)
little more than a decade later by the United States Supreme Court’s similar holding in
Pennsylvania Bd. of Probation v. Scott, 524 U.S. 357, 118 S. Ct. 2014, 141 L. Ed. 2d 344
(1998).
Md. 673, 537 A.2d 250 (1988) (in construing Maryland Code Article 27, § 551, concluding
that federal exclusionary rule not applicable to civil proceedings for return of seized
property); Whitaker v. Prince George’s County, 307 Md. 368, 514 A.2d 4 (1986) (generally
rejecting application of exclusionary rule in public nuisance actions).
We emphasized in Whitaker that although the Supreme Court’s ruling in Janis “cannot
be said to stand for the proposition that evidence may never be excluded in a civil
proceeding, it nonetheless severely undermined those cases in lower courts which applied
the exclusionary rule to civil proceedings.” Id. at 382, 514 A.2d at 11 (citation and footnote
omitted). Furthermore, the Supreme Court has unequivocally “established that the ‘prime
purpose’ of the rule, if not the sole one, ‘is to deter future unlawful police conduct.’” Janis,
428 U.S. at 446, 96 S. Ct. at 3028 (quoting Calandra, 414 U.S. at 347, 94 S. Ct. at 619);
Whitaker, 307 Md. at 381, 514 A.2d at 11.
We have noted the marginal deterrent effect and the substantial costs of applying the
exclusionary rule of the Fourth Amendment beyond the context of criminal or quasi-criminal
proceedings. For example, in rejecting the application of the rule in public nuisance
proceedings, we noted that “[a] detective who might be tempted to obtain evidence illegally
for use in a criminal case may not even consider the effect of such illegality upon a
proceeding to abate a public nuisance.” Id. at 383, 514 A.2d at 12. We have also expressed
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concern with the effect of applying the exclusionary rule in streamlined administrative
proceedings. See Sheetz, 315 Md. at 215 n. 8, 553 A.2d at 1284 n. 8 (“‘On the cost side
there is the loss of often probative evidence and all of the secondary costs that flow from the
less accurate or more cumbersome adjudication that therefore occurs.’” (quoting
Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. at 1041, 104 S. Ct. at 3485)).
IV.
Given the general background of the exclusionary rule of the Fourth Amendment and
the substantial body of precedent under both the Supreme Court and this Court generally
refusing to extend its operation beyond the context of a criminal trial, we shall now proceed
to determine whether the rule should be applied as a matter of principle to hearings
conducted pursuant to § 16-205.1(f). In light of that precedent, we shall focus on whether
the benefits of applying the exclusionary rule to administrative license suspension hearings
outweigh the costs of such.
At the outset, we reject the notion that an administrative license suspension
proceeding under § 16-205.1(f) requires the application of the exclusionary rule of the Fourth
Amendment because such a proceeding is “quasi-criminal” in nature. Respondent has taken
great pains to distinguish the administrative proceeding in the present case, a “refusal”
hearing, from a hearing under the same statute with respect to a person who took the
chemical breath test and “failed” (by registering a blood-alcohol content of .10 percent or
higher) as well as from other purely civil proceedings. Along these lines, Respondent asserts
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the refusal hearing to be “purely punitive” and “quasi-criminal” in nature, therefore
analogizing it to the civil in rem forfeiture proceeding, to which we recently held the
exclusionary rule of the Fourth Amendment applicable. See One 1995 Corvette v. Baltimore,
353 Md. 114, 724 A.2d 680 (1999).
Writing for the Court in 1995 Corvette, Judge Cathell stated that “the Fourth
Amendment applies to all ‘unreasonable searches and seizures’ by the government, regardless
of context.” Id. at 129, 724 A.2d at 688 (citation omitted) (first emphasis added). On the
other hand, as Judge Cathell prefaced, the exclusionary rule of that Amendment “is a
judicially-created remedy intended to apply primarily to criminal and ‘quasi-criminal’
proceedings.” Id., 724 A.2d at 688. Moreover, in labeling the forfeiture proceeding in One
1958 Plymouth Sedan v. Pennsylvania, 380 U.S. 693, 85 S. Ct. 1246, 14 L. Ed. 2d 170
(1965), “quasi-criminal,” the Supreme Court explained that the object of a forfeiture
proceeding, “like a criminal proceeding, is to penalize for the commission of an offense
against the law.” Id. at 700, 85 S. Ct. at 1250 (quoted in 1995 Corvette, 353 Md. at 121, 724
A.2d at 683).
We disagree with Respondent’s characterization of § 16-205.1 as “quasi-criminal.”
This Court has on several occasions addressed the purposes behind this State’s legislation
against “drunken driving.” It is true that “[t]he General Assembly’s goal in enacting the
drunk driving laws . . . is ‘to meet the considerable challenge created by this problem by
enacting a series of measures to rid our highways of the drunk driver menace. These
measures . . . are primarily designed to enhance the ability of prosecutors to deal effectively
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with the drunk driver problem.’” Motor Vehicle Admin. v. Shrader, 324 Md. 454, 464, 597
A.2d 939, 944 (1991) (quoting Willis v. State, 302 Md. 363, 369-70, 488 A.2d 171, 175
(1985)). Nevertheless, as we emphasized in Shrader, § 16-205.1 and related statutory
provisions “were enacted for the protection of the public and not primarily for the protection
of the accused.” Id. at 464, 597 A.2d at 943 (citations omitted).
This Court has also previously found “that license suspensions generally serve
remedial purposes,” a conclusion “drawn from the purposes served by licensing systems
themselves, i.e. to protect the public from unscrupulous or unskilled operators who would
otherwise engage in the licensed activity.” State v. Jones, 340 Md. 235, 251, 666 A.2d 128,
136 (1995) (holding that separate subjugation of motorist to criminal prosecution and
administrative sanctions under § 16-205.1 does not run afoul of double jeopardy prohibition).
Moreover, as we went on in Jones to elaborate,
From the licensee’s perspective, it is certainly true that
suspension or revocation of a license may feel like
‘punishment.’ A licensing system’s ultimate goal, however, is
to prevent unscrupulous or incompetent persons from engaging
in the licensed activity. To this end, revocation or suspension
of a license clearly prevents a wrongdoer from further engaging
in the licensed activity, at least temporarily.
Id. at 252, 666 A.2d at 136 (footnote omitted) (emphasis added). The Supreme Court made
similar observations while reviewing Massachusetts’s implied consent, administrative per
se statute in 1979. Albeit expressed in the context of reviewing that statute for comportment
with the requirements of due process, those observations are nonetheless appropriate here:
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The Commonwealth’s interest in public safety is
substantially served by the summary suspension of those who
refuse in several ways to take a breath-analysis test upon arrest.
First, the very existence of the summary sanction of the statute
serves as a deterrent to drunken driving. Second, it provides
strong inducement to take the breath-analysis test and thus
effectuates the Commonwealth’s interest in obtaining reliable
and relevant evidence for use in subsequent criminal
proceedings. Third, in promptly removing such drivers from the
road, the summary sanction of the statute contributes to the
safety of public highways.
The summary and automatic character of the suspension
sanction available under the statute is critical to attainment of
these objectives.
Mackey v. Montrym, 443 U.S. 1, 18, 99 S. Ct. 2612, 2621, 61 L. Ed. 2d 321 (1979).
Given the similarly multi-purposed nature of the sanctions in § 16-205.1, we do not
view the statute as quasi-criminal. See Powell v. Secretary of State, 614 A.2d 1303, 1307
(Me. 1992) (concluding that “a license suspension hearing is not a quasi-criminal
proceeding”). Nor do we see any principled reason to differentiate for our present inquiry
a license suspension hearing under § 16-205.1(f)(1)(ii)(1)—for test failures—from one under
§ 16-205.1(f)(1)(ii)(2)—for test refusals. Though prompted by distinct occurrences, the two
hearings are both remedial in nature: their primary goals are first, to help effectuate the
administrative goals of the MVA in ridding Maryland roadways of drunk drivers and,
second, to encourage both general compliance with Maryland law as well as specific
fulfillment of the consent to taking a properly requested chemical breath test implied by a
motorist’s entry upon and usage of this State’s roads.
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10 Despite Respondent’s flawed assertion that “the refusal to take the test . . . is
inadmissible in the criminal proceeding” independent of the exclusionary rule of the Fourth
Amendment, see supra note 3, it cannot be denied that even in the case of a test refusal, other
valuable evidence could be excluded from a criminal trial if the officer’s detention of the
motorist was constitutionally invalid and the issue is properly raised.
With respect to the benefit of applying the exclusionary rule of the Fourth
Amendment in a § 16-205.1(f) hearing, whether the case involves test failure or test refusal,
we do not view any possible deterrent effect to be sufficiently significant. In either case,
there would likely be only scant marginal deterrence because the police already suffer the
exclusion of unlawfully seized evidence from criminal proceedings.10 See Pennsylvania Bd.
of Probation v. Scott, 524 U.S. 357, , 118 S. Ct. 2014, 2020, 141 L. Ed. 2d 344 (1998);
United States v. Janis, 428 U.S. 433, 448, 96 S. Ct. 3021, 3029, 49 L. Ed. 2d 1046 (1976);
United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 351, 94 S. Ct. 613, 621, 38 L. Ed. 2d 561 (1974).
Furthermore, because the MVA is a separate and independent agency from the police
department and has no control over the actions of police officers, imposing the exclusionary
rule in license suspension proceedings would add little force to the deterrence of unlawful
police action. See Riche v. Director of Revenue, 987 S.W.2d 331, 335 (Mo. 1999) (en banc);
Westendorf v. Iowa Dept. of Transp., 400 N.W.2d 553, 557 (Iowa 1987). We find as a
general matter that the administrative mechanisms and proceedings relative to license
suspension or revocation fall “outside the offending officer’s zone of primary interest.”
Janis, 428 U.S. at 458, 96 S. Ct. at 3034; see also Scott, 524 U.S. at , 118 S. Ct. at 2022.
There is scarce reason to believe that police would be motivated to seize evidence illegally
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simply to use it in license suspension proceedings. See Scott, 524 U.S. at , 118 S. Ct. at
2022 (commenting that “the officer’s focus is not upon ensuring compliance with parole
conditions or obtaining evidence for introduction at administrative proceedings, but upon
obtaining convictions of those who commit crimes.”). See also Sheetz v. City of Baltimore,
315 Md. 208, 215, 553 A.2d 1281, 1284 (1989) (“Because their primary interest is not
typically in [employment] discharge proceedings, the police are not especially tempted to
violate the fourth amendment in order to obtain evidence for such proceedings. Therefore,
in this context, the exclusionary rule, designed to deter such violations, is not particularly
useful.” (footnote omitted)); Com., Dept. of Transp. v. Wysocki, 535 A.2d 77, 79 (Pa. 1987)
(stating that basis for employing Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule is to deter police
officials from engaging in improper conduct for purpose of obtaining criminal convictions).
Cf. 1995 Corvette, 353 Md. at 138, 724 A.2d at 692, (with respect to law enforcement
forfeitures, noting that “governments increasingly have filed civil forfeiture actions in lieu
of criminal charges, knowing that constitutional protections provide greater obstacles to their
criminal cases, and that forfeitures have a great financial impact only on the defendant but
on the government’s coffers as well”). Finally, as we have stated in the past, police officers
still will be deterred from violating drivers’ constitutional rights despite the non-exclusion
of evidence in administrative license proceedings because they are subject to other penalties
and civil liabilities for engaging in such conduct. See Chase v. State, 309 Md. 224, 253, 522
A.2d 1348, 1362 (1987).
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In contrast to the limited deterrent value, the costs of applying the exclusionary rule
of the Fourth Amendment in hearings under § 16-205.1(f) are great. The underlying purpose
of administrative license suspensions, the protection of the public, would be undermined.
See Powell, 614 A.2d at 1307. Whereas the General Assembly has given high priority to
the enforcement of drunk driving laws and its expected increase in the safety of Maryland’s
roadways, see generally Department of Legislative Reference, Bill Files for Senate Bill 398
and House Bill 556 (1989), we agree with the conclusion of the Supreme Judicial Court of
Maine that
the application of fourth amendment principles would add an
undue burden to license suspension hearings. . . . [A] license
suspension hearing is not a quasi-criminal proceeding, but rather
a “reasonable regulatory measure to protect public safety.”
Requiring hearing examiners to apply the exclusionary rule
would unnecessarily complicate and burden an administrative
proceeding designed to focus on the single issue of whether a
person was operating a vehicle with excessive alcohol in his
blood.
Powell, 614 A.2d at 1307.
In Janes v. State, 350 Md. 284, 301, 711 A.2d 1319, 1327 (1998), we observed that
proceedings like those under § 16-205.1 are intended to be informal and summary in nature.
See also Riche, 987 S.W.2d at 334 (concluding that extending the exclusionary rule to
administrative license suspension hearings “would impose significant costs to society . . .
[and] would unnecessarily complicate and burden an administrative process designed to
remove drunken drivers from Missouri’s roads and highways as quickly as possible.”).
Affording licensees the opportunity to invoke the exclusionary rule of the Fourth
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Amendment in license suspension proceedings would not only interfere with the informal
and summary nature of those proceedings but also alter their purposefully limited scope, as
prescribed under § 16-205.1(f)(7). Cf. Scott, 524 U.S. at , 118 S. Ct. at 2020-21 (finding
that application of exclusionary rule would significantly alter traditionally flexible and
informal administrative procedures of parole revocation because exclusionary rule frequently
requires extensive litigation that is inconsistent with nonadversarial, administrative
processes); I.N.S. v. Lopez- Mendoza, 468 U.S. 1032, 1048, 104 S. Ct. 3479, 3488, 82 L. Ed.
2d 778 (1984) (observing that prospect of even occasional invocation of exclusionary rule
might significantly change and complicate character of deportation system).
Because of the only marginal—if any—deterrent effect of excluding evidence from
administrative license suspension proceedings, and in light of the nature and purpose of this
State’s administrative per se statute in general and of the license suspension hearings under
§ 16-205.1(f) in particular, we hold that the exclusionary rule of the Fourth Amendment
should not be extended to proceedings conducted pursuant thereto.
Although we have concluded that the exclusionary rule of the Fourth Amendment is
not applicable in license suspension proceedings under § 16-205.1, we are nevertheless
concerned, as in Sheetz and Chase, that our decision today not be abused. We need not,
however, dictate an exception to our general rule that the exclusionary rule does not apply
in administrative license suspension proceedings, as we found necessary in those two cases
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11 As we reiterated and applied in Sheetz v. Mayor and City Council of Baltimore, 315
Md. 208, 553 A.2d 1281 (1989):
[W]e established in Chase [v. State, 309 Md. 224, 522
A.2d 1348 (1987)] an exception to the admissibility of illegally
obtained evidence: “when the officer has acted in bad faith and
not as a reasonable officer would and should act in similar
circumstances, the evidence should, in any event, be
suppressed.” 309 Md. at 253, 522 A.2d at 1362. The Court
reasoned that “it would derogate due process of law to presume
conclusively that in such cases the police officer acted in good
faith.” 309 Md. at 253, 522 A.2d at 1363. Thus “[e]vidence
concerning the officer’s conduct which would be sufficient to
call upon the State to rebut is credible evidence indicating prima
facie to the satisfaction of the hearing judge that the officer’s
actions were not in accord with reasonable law enforcement
activities but were prompted by improper motives.” 309 Md. at
254, 522 A.2d at 1363.
Id. at 213, 553 A.2d at 1283 (third alteration in original).
12 Respondent takes issue with the promulgation of COMAR 11.11.02.10H(1) being
viewed as setting out a “good faith exception” to the application of the exclusionary rule of
the Fourth Amendment in proceedings under § 16-205.1(f). Given our determination that
the exclusionary rule is not applicable, this COMAR provision is indeed not a “good faith
exception” but rather a “bad faith” basis for exclusion of evidence of test refusal or test
failure at a license suspension hearing.
with respect to the administrative proceedings involved therein.11 The current statutory and
regulatory framework for § 16-205.1 adequately addresses our similar concerns in the present
matter. As noted in the State’s brief, the MVA accounted for this Court’s concerns in Sheetz
and Chase by promulgating COMAR 11.11.02.10H(1) with respect to § 16-205.1(f)
hearings. That regulation provides that when a police officer, in obtaining or seizing
disputed evidence, acted in bad faith and not as a reasonable officer should act in similar
circumstances, the evidence is inadmissible.12
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In conclusion, because the exclusionary rule of the Fourth Amendment does not apply
in civil administrative license proceedings under § 16-205.1(f), and because the ALJ found
the initial stop to have been made in good faith, the circuit court erred in ruling that
Respondent’s license was not properly suspended for failing to take a chemical breath test
when legitimately requested to do so.
JUDGMENT OF THE CIRCUIT COURT FOR
CARROLL COUNTY REVERSED. CASE
REMANDED TO THAT COURT WITH
INSTRUCTIONS TO AFFIRM THE RULING
OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE
PRESIDING OVER RESPONDENT’S LICENSE
SUSPENSION HEARING. COSTS TO BE
PAID BY RESPONDENT.
Judge Rodowsky concurs in the result only.